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ABSTRACT 
As the Department of Homeland Security continues to develop plans and 
strategies to guide our government towards a safer environment, state, local, and tribal 
law enforcement agencies are struggling to define their role in the Homeland Security 
Mission. This paper proposes the creation of a National Law Enforcement Network made 
up of the state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies throughout the country. The 
network design will allow local agencies to reach beyond the traditional law enforcement 
approach by establishing formal networks that facilitate local, regional, national and 
eventually global coordination of an effective strategy aimed at preventing future terror 
attacks in the homeland.  
The creation of this network will ensure that every police officer in the United 
States understands their role in preventing future attacks. Drilling down to the lowest 
local level to include businesses, industry and the private sector, the formation of the 
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With all of the talk about “connecting the dots”1 there has been little focus on 
how to identify the “dots” in the first place. After all, the dots, (or bits and pieces of 
information), that may be linked to terrorist activity can be very subtle and are often 
difficult to identify. While it is not complicated to identify and assemble known bits and 
pieces of information after an attack has occurred, it is seldom that simple before the 
event. The ability to recognize the links between unusual behavior, or subtle activities, 
and potential preparation for a terrorist attack can be extremely difficult; especially for 
federal intelligence agencies that have the responsibility of scanning the globe for 
potential threats. While most agree it is reasonable to hold federal intelligence agencies 
accountable for analyzing and connecting the dots, it is unrealistic to think they will be 
able to identify all of them. Preventing future terror attacks will not be possible without 
an effective system for collecting and connecting the important bits and pieces of 
information needed to identify and stop terrorists before they strike. Today’s terrorism is 
a local crime and with the potential for future attacks increasing, it is essential that we 
engage the more than 800,000 state, local and tribal police officers that work in our local 
communities in strategic prevention activities that will assist them with identifying those 
dots. 
The ability to recognize this type of behavior or subtle activity requires a balance 
of knowledge, familiarity, experience and skill; all of which have been mastered by 
police officers when it comes to dealing with traditional crime. Local law enforcement 
has the structure, systems, skills and performance metrics already in place to understand 
and deal with traditional crime and they are eager to be included in the Homeland 
Security Mission. Preventing terror attacks must be viewed as a priority in the Homeland 
Security Mission and leaving local law enforcement out of the national prevention 
strategy is no longer a defendable option. 
                                                 
1 “Connecting the dots” refers to the intelligence community’s ability to relate important pieces of 
information through analysis and identify potentially dangerous or threatening activity or patterns of 
activity.  
2 
In today’s environment we must consider strategies that will allow us to defend 
our nation from terrorists who operate in increasingly diverse networks and are skilled at 
blending among us as they plan and carry out asymmetric attacks in our local 
communities; a concept we have still not been able to come to grips with as a nation. 
Despite numerous and progressively more deadly attacks2 within the United States, we 
are still a nation of confidence, comfort and complacency when it comes to our 
vulnerability to future attacks. However, the reality is that terrorists will continue to 
launch attacks in the United States and our government has an obligation to do everything 
within its power to protect our citizens by improving our ability to identify the important 
and sometimes subtle, bits and pieces of information that may prevent an attack before it 
occurs.  
With the growing need for global situational awareness, most agree that 
connecting the dots should remain the responsibility of the federal intelligence agencies, 
which have years of experience and the resources available to analyze intelligence; 
however, domestically, it is the local police officers who are on the front lines interacting 
with hundreds of thousands of individuals and businesses each day that will be the ones 
who discover most of them.  
1. Framing the Issues: Whose Job is it Anyway? 
There are mixed messages being sent when it comes to who is actually supposed 
to do what in the Homeland Security Mission and confusion remains about who will be 
held accountable for what. 
In the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks there was a whirlwind of controversy 
surrounding our nation’s ability to detect and respond to such a devastating attack that 
had literally been planned in our own backyard. While the Department of Defense, 
federal intelligence agencies and elected leaders underwent round after round of criticism 
for failing to recognize the increasing threat posed by terrorists, local police leaders were 
                                                 
2 Bruce Hoffman, Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities, in Technology and 
Terrorism, ed., Paul Wilkerson (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1993), 21. See also “Current and Projected 
National Security Threats to the United States,” Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy, Director, 
(Defense Intelligence Agency, February 2005).  
3 
taking advantage of this rare opportunity to emphasize the impact of being ignored as the 
first responders to acts of terrorism.3  
But given this opportunity, local law enforcement leaders did not stress (or maybe 
did not even realize) how critical a role they play in detecting and deterring terrorist 
activities and preventing attacks. After all, no one blamed police officials for failing to 
understand the threat or questioned why hundreds of thousands of police officers 
engaging in community policing4 and criminal investigations every day never detected 
the presence of the 9-11 operators who had been living in and preparing for the attacks in 
the communities officers were sworn to protect.  
Given the benefit of hindsight, one can’t help but wonder if things would be 
different for police officers today if the 9-11 Commission had questioned police leaders 
about why their officers didn’t know the terrorist were operating in their community? 
What if police chiefs had been asked how much time they had invested in training their 
officers to recognize potential indicators of terrorist activity prior to 9-11? It seems 
reasonable that things would be different had these issues been raised in 2001; just as it is 
likely that these questions will be raised in the aftermath of the next attack. 
Raising this issue is not meant to criticize police leaders for actions in past events, 
but more to bring attention to the critical gaps in our National Homeland Security 
Strategy that may bring harsh criticism in the future. While it can be assumed that local 
law enforcement leaders had at least some indication that terrorists continued to pose a 
threat to the United States following the attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993 and 
the Alfred P. Murrah Building in 1995; I would suggest that the reason police leaders did 
not pursue terrorist-related training and preparation more aggressively had more to do 
with understanding their role than it did with understanding the threat. Until recently, 
counter-terrorism had always been viewed as a federal responsibility, not a local one; 
which made sense in the past when the primary terrorist threat came from state actors 
                                                 
3 A. Chambers, “Terrorism’s Cost Hit Home,” Illinois Issues, May 2002. 
[www.illinoisissues.uis.edu/features/2002/may/terrorism.html]. August 13, 2005.  
4 Community policing is a term commonly used to describe a method of deploying police officers to 
fixed geographical areas to enhance their relationship with members of the community. The goal of 
community policing is to promote pro-active problem solving and crime prevention through police 
community partnerships.   
4 
who threatened us from afar. But it does not make sense today, as it is clear that the 
primary threat of future terror attacks comes from decentralized terror cells that exist 
within our borders. Counter-terrorism can no longer be viewed as a federal responsibility 
and local law enforcement leaders must adapt and broaden their expertise beyond 
response.    
Unfortunately, this mentality is not new for Americans and is certainly not limited 
to the law enforcement community. In general, Americans still feel that the FBI, CIA and 
the Department of Defense are responsible for defending the homeland and preventing 
terrorist attacks, so much so that the FBI was publicly criticized after 9-11 for choosing to 
“serve local priorities, not national priorities.”5  
The lack of support for local law enforcement when it comes to counter-terrorism 
continues to present a challenge for law enforcement leaders who understand the 
importance of their role in preventing future attacks.  
2. The Current Situation 
On July 16, 2002, President George W. Bush wrote in his opening letter 
announcing the National Strategy for Homeland Security; “This is a national strategy, not 
a federal strategy.”6 The strategy itself supports this idea by reinforcing that the goal of 
the National Strategy for Homeland Security was designed to be “a concerted national 
effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability 
to terrorism and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”7  
Since that time the Department of Homeland Security has produced more than a 
dozen documents to build on that concept through the release of the National Response 
Plan, the National Incident Management System, the National Preparedness Goals and 
numerous other “how to” manuals. However, these documents and the overall concept of 
homeland security still remain primarily a federal effort to support a federal strategy. 
Despite everyone’s best efforts, the strategy and the idea of homeland security, has yet to 
                                                 
5 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: The 9/11 Commission Report 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 74. 
6 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, Letter to the American 
People, July 16, 2002, Office of Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
2002), 4. 
7 Ibid., 2. 
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evolve into a concerted national effort that includes key players at the local level.8 
Although an overarching concept of operations for protecting our homeland has been 
articulated, constructing a framework for national coordination will require significant 
transformation of long-standing perceptions and traditions that present challenges to 
accomplishing this goal. 
It is clear that the President’s intention was to create an efficient “system” that 
includes the use of federal, state and local governments as well as private security to 
prevent, deter and respond to terror attacks within the United States; however, we are still 
struggling to break away from the traditional independent systems that are entrenched in 
our government. Despite the significant internal improvements made within each 
discipline over the past few years, each continues to operate independently when it comes 
to prevention, deterrence and response. Therefore this paper will propose an effective 
method for integrating the state, local and tribal law enforcement (SLTLE) component 
into the larger Homeland Security “system” envisioned by the President when the 
National Strategy was developed.  
3. Progress Toward an Efficient System  
The idea to create the Department of Homeland Security was based on the 
concept that there must be a unified effort within the primary disciplines before a 
coordinated strategic effort could be effectively implemented. This effort began with the 
integration of 22 domestic security related agencies under the Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security in 2002.9 The evolution continued in 2004 when the 
Director of National Intelligence was appointed to coordinate the efforts of the 14 
agencies that make up the nation’s intelligence community.10 However, there has been no 
such effort to coordinate the work of more than 18,000 SLTLE agencies. 
It is clear that there is still much to be done in the way of creating efficient 
national systems within each of the disciplines before a truly unified national effort to 
                                                 
8 IACP, “From Hometown Security to Homeland Security: Principles for a Locally Designed and 
Nationally Coordinated Homeland Security Strategy,” Report to the Department of Homeland Security 
(2005), 2.  
9 Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101), November 25, 2002. 
10 The Director of National Intelligence is a Cabinet level position created in February, 2005 (50 USC. 
403-1). 
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prevent and respond to terrorism can begin. If critical assets in the key sectors remain 
disjointed and without the structure needed to ensure a smooth transition into the larger 
national homeland security system we will once again find ourselves explaining why we 
failed to connect the dots after the next attack. Therefore the effort must begin with a 
structure that will synchronize the work of the agencies within each discipline and 
provide them with a common understanding of their mission. 
B. DEFINING THE STRATEGIC ISSUES: CONFUSION REMAINS 
The National Strategy loosely defines law enforcement’s role as one of 
“preventing and interdicting terrorist activity within the United States,”11 but the lack of 
clarity and guidance has resulted in some significant strategic issues for the SLTLE 
leadership.   
The first deals with the continued emphasis on response. While purchasing 
personal protective equipment and response vehicles are important elements of our 
preparedness, this approach suggests that we are helpless to prevent future attacks and 
sends a clear message to society that the only role of police officers is to respond to and 
deal with the aftermath of the next attack. This is a disturbing mindset in light of what we 
have learned about the obvious indicators that were missed in the weeks and months 
leading up to the 9-11 attacks.  
The second is our national focus on preparing only those agencies in the largest 
most densely populated cities, essentially ignoring the role of nearly 80% of the police 
agencies in the United States.12 Although there is clearly a need to consider the likelihood 
of another attack on a major U.S. city, focusing solely on response capabilities in our 
most populated cities ignores the role of many smaller agencies in detecting the subtle 
behaviors and activities that may be associated with terrorists preparing for an attack. It 
also ignores the potential for smaller attacks against soft targets in areas outside of the 
major cities within the United States.13 These are important gaps considering what is 
                                                 
11 Office of Homeland Security, “National Strategy for Homeland Security” (July 2002), 25. 
12 The average police department in the United States has 25 or fewer sworn police officers.  
13 Targets such as amusement parks, stadiums, transportation systems, schools, or remote critical 
infrastructure are just a few examples of potential targets located in rural areas outside of major cities that if 
attacked could create a sense that no one is safe; maximizing the primary goal of the terrorists. 
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known about how terrorists target, gather resources and prepare for attacks. One only 
needs to pay attention to the attacks that continue to take place around the world to 
realize that soft targets are becoming increasingly attractive to terrorists who are efficient 
at exploiting our vulnerabilities. The openness of the American society combined with 
the network capabilities of terrorists and the ease of transportation does not limit 
terrorists to large urban areas within the United States. While terrorists may target large 
urban areas, they can mobilize, plan, secure resources and then deploy from out of the 
way rural locations as was the case in the recent bombings in London.14 
Lastly, with all of the focus on national intelligence requirements and information 
sharing, there has been little time to focus on the intelligence requirements of the 
SLTLE’s. Since terrorism is a global phenomenon that presents local threats, our national 
efforts must focus on creating a mechanism for the SLTLE to report and share critical 
information in all directions; internally among the various units within the agency, as 
well as externally with other SLTLE agencies, federal intelligence agencies, the private 
sector, and ultimately, internationally with their counterparts in other regions of the 
world. This will be a quantum leap for police agencies who are still struggling to get 
homicide detectives and narcotics investigators to share information within their own 
organizations. Therefore, the leadership must begin by establishing the conduits for 
communication and developing a single set of standards, policies and practices that will 
expedite critical information and intelligence sharing. 
All of the strategic issues identified are the result of a single dilemma that has 
created similar challenges for law enforcement in the past; without a national police force 
there is no central authority or single strategy designed specifically to guide state and 
local law enforcement when it comes to defining their role in the Homeland Security 
Mission. Unlike the specific roles set forth for each of the federal agencies in the National 




                                                 
14 Bombers in the London attack resided in Leeds, a rural community more than 180 miles from 
London. 
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expectations for each of the SLTLE agencies when it comes to homeland security leaving 
many of the smaller agencies, outside of large urban areas with a sense that “nothing has 
changed since 9-11.” 
With each state responsible for creating their own Homeland Security Strategy15  
there is no overarching concept of operations that facilitates a unified effort from law 
enforcement. Creating a unified strategy for the more than 18,000 SLTLE agencies will 
be a complex task, but it can and must be done.  
1. Funding  
Since September 11, 2001, there have been a variety of funding programs 
designed to increase the level of response preparedness at the local level. Unfortunately, 
the majority of these programs have only been made available to the larger police 
agencies that serve in the most densely populated cities across the country. While large 
metropolitan areas are realistically the most attractive targets for terrorist who wish to 
carryout mass casualty attacks, this methodology ignores the fact that such groups 
typically spend a great deal of time living, planning and training for these attacks in the 
smaller suburban and rural areas of our country.  Therefore there must be a shift in the 
allocation of funding that includes all elements of prevention and incorporates all law 
enforcement agencies regardless of size or geographical jurisdiction.   
The Office for Domestic Preparedness published guidelines for terrorism 
prevention and deterrence in 2003 recommending that policy makers and stakeholders 
work collaboratively to “establish a framework for prevention unique to the jurisdiction’s 
capabilities, threats, vulnerabilities, and risks, as well as the resources available.”16 
Clearly, there is a unique role for the rural agencies when it comes to recognizing the 
threat posed by terrorist who may be living in and preparing for an attack in their local 
communities. Threat recognition must be integrated into the daily activities of the officers 
responsible for law enforcement in areas that are most vulnerable to terrorist activities 
that may indicate the preparatory stages of an attack.  
                                                 
15 George W. Bush, “Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, National Preparedness” (December 17, 
2003,), 9. 
16 Office for Domestic Preparedness, “Guidelines for Homeland Security: Prevention and Deterrence” 
(June 2003), 4. 
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Although the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 
early 2003 has improved the distribution and standardization of some of these funding 
programs, there is still a lack of clarity as to who determines the appropriate level of 
training and types of equipment each individual agency should acquire. This issue is 
exacerbated by the fact that many law enforcement agencies have no idea what their role 
is in supporting the National Homeland Security Strategy on a daily basis much less 
during another large scale attack. 
In a public statement released on July 13, 2005, Secretary Chertoff announced his 
intention to revise the DHS Grant program for state and local partners to include a risk-
based distribution of funding that will apply to all preparedness activities.17 Since 
preparedness activities include planning and prevention, this proposed “risk-based” 
method for supplying funding must consider the vulnerability that exists outside of our 
major cities when it comes to terrorist planning activities. It must also consider the 
increased risk we face as a nation if these local jurisdictions are not included in the 
prevention preparedness strategy in the future.    
With this in mind, the goal of this research is to resolve the issues noted above 
through the development of a National Law Enforcement Network made up of the 
SLTLE that would facilitate their integration into the National Homeland Security 
Strategy. The following concepts will be proposed: 
• Creation of a mission based, National Law Enforcement Network that 
includes all SLTLE agencies. 
• Creation of a Local Business Network through the expansion of existing 
terrorism prevention programs that rely on the private sector, businesses 
and industries vulnerable to terrorists exploitation or attack. 
• Creation of regional fusion centers that will serve as the hubs for the 
National Law Enforcement Network, the Local Business Network and the 
                                                 
17 Michael Chertoff, “Second Stage Review of the Department of Homeland Security” (Department of 
Homeland Security Press Office), July 13, 2005, [www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4598], 
retrieved on July 16, 2005. 
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federal intelligence community, to analyze and share critical information 
within the United States and with other regions of the world.  
The policy options proposed have been formulated based on supporting the 
National Strategy at the local level and will support four basic principles. 
• The creation of a unified prevention strategy that will be useful to all law 
enforcement agencies at the local level, regardless of size or location. 
• Developing a model that will assist with the equitable distribution of 
federal funding to state and local agencies using the new “risk-based” 
analysis. 
• Consideration for the sensitive public and political expectations and 
consequences associated with government prevention activities.  
• Determination of operational feasibility that will be sustainable over time 
without diminishing the demands of traditional law enforcement activities 
that must be maintained.    
C. METHODOLOGY 
As a local law enforcement practitioner responsible for implementing the 
operational aspects of new federal guidelines and mandates pertaining to homeland 
security, the goal of this paper was initially to clarify some of the complex issues that 
many agencies at the local level are struggling with. The motivation for this research was 
to identify problems and propose solutions to some of the many issues faced by local law 
enforcement when it comes to engaging in the Homeland Security Mission. However, 
through the course of study it became clear that this is not a situation that involves well 
defined problems for which simple solutions can be devised. Rather it is a situation where 
the issues are difficult to define due to the larger social and political components that are 
part of a system that presents multiple opportunities for improvement.18  
                                                 
18 Dale Couprie, Alan Goodbrand, Bin Li, and David Zhu, “Soft Systems Methodology,” Department 
of Computer Science (University of Calgary, 2002), retrieved from 
http://sern.ucalgary.ca/courses/seng613/F97/grp4/ssmfinal.html, September 4, 2005.  
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As such, applied and pure research methods would not serve the purpose of this 
inquiry. As a result, a Soft Systems Approach19  was used to evaluate the existing body of 
knowledge on law enforcement’s role in preventing terror attacks, including a review of 
existing written material, interviews with first responders and subject matter experts, as 
well as the personal experiences of the author.  However, it is important to note that this 
topic pertains to an evolving field of study that is still in its infancy and is being 
developed from an emerging threat that is not fully understood as of this writing. 
Therefore, the most relevant information comes from analyzing strategies presently under 
development by the Department of Homeland Security when considered in context with 
the current local law enforcement environment.  
Ultimately, the information contained in this paper attempts to capture the 
“problem situation” and propose a conceptual model that will improve our national 
prevention efforts using the Soft Systems Approach. The model proposed includes the 
creation of a National Prevention Network that incorporates state, local and tribal law 
enforcement agencies, as well as the private sector, into a unified system that will allow 
local agencies to reach beyond the traditional law enforcement approach. This network 
design establishes formal conduits for information sharing and operational planning that 
will facilitate local, regional, national and eventually global coordination of an effective 





                                                 
19 The Soft Systems Approach was developed by Peter Checkland specifically to define problem 
situations that exist when systems are not functioning at the desired level. This approach requires the 
researcher to analyze the role of stakeholders and diagram key processes in order to propose a conceptual 
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II. CHALLENGES  
A. PERCEPTIONS AND THREATS  
Despite military successes we can expect terrorism to be a constant threat for 
many years to come.20 With terror cells and supporters increasing across the globe, 
terrorist networks are continuing to expand and become more difficult to identify. With 
Iraq serving as the new training ground for thousands of terrorists who have united 
against the West in, what they perceive as a “global jihad,” the risk for continued and 
repeated attacks within the United States is increasing and can no longer be ignored.  
1. Understanding the Threat 
Considering that the primary terrorist threat to the United States, at least in theory, 
has historically been from “state sponsored terrorism,” it was logical to view 
responsibility for defending against this threat to be one of the military and federal 
intelligence agencies. It has long been speculated that state sponsored terrorist 
organizations have refrained from attacking the United States because of the fear of harsh 
retaliation by our military; as foreign governments feared the sure, swift response that 
would undoubtedly be unleashed by the world’s superpower in retaliation for any attack 
against the homeland.21 Unfortunately, it is likely this perception that has led to our 
complacency and fostered our sense of invincibility for many years while other countries 
around the globe suffered repeated attacks.  
But our enemies and their motivations have changed and are becoming 
increasingly difficult to identify before they engage in attacks. With the decentralization 
of terror cells around the world, nation states that wish to do us harm can easily do so by 
providing resources to smaller terror cells that can carryout the attacks, thus creating a 
layer of protection for the state. As such, these emerging threats and complicated 
                                                 
20 John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michael Zanini, “Countering the New Terrorism: Networks, 
Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999). See also Robert Mueller’s 
Statement to Congress (February 2005). 
21 Claire Sterling, The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart & Winston, 1981), 12. See also Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism: The Soviet 
Connection (New York: Crane Russak, 1984), 44. Or Roberta Goren, ed. Jillian Becker, The Soviet Union 
and Terrorism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984). 
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dynamics dictate that our strategy for dealing with this new form of terrorism must shift 
from one of military deterrence to one of strategic prevention at all levels.  
B. TRANSITION TO FOURTH GENERATION TACTICS 
Unfortunately, our vulnerability to attack was not realized until al Qaeda carried 
out simultaneous suicide attacks on two major cities in the United States. Despite 
previous large scale attacks carried out by both foreign and domestic terrorist in 1993 at 
the World Trade Center and in 1995 at the federal building in Oklahoma City, we 
continued to ignore the increasing threat and somehow missed indicators that terrorists 
were planning the largest terror attack on U.S. soil in our history. In all of these cases fear 
of retaliation by U.S. Armed Forces did not deter these terrorists from crossing a line that 
has for many years been avoided by other terrorists. But the motivations and tactics of the 
adversary has changed22 and as we move through the new era of globalization, we must 
reassess our counter-terrorism strategies and evolve along with the terrorist who have de-
centralized and morphed into an enemy that is far more deadly and even more difficult to 
detect and deter. Unable to go toe-to-toe with our military, the terrorists have made the 
transition to what is now recognized as fourth generation warfare,23 bringing the battle to 
our local communities and we must quickly adapt to prepare for what will likely be a 
long-term struggle.24 
1. Islamic Fundamentalist 
One form of terrorism that will significantly impact the United States in the future 
is the proliferation of radical Islamic Fundamentalist groups.25 It is this group in 
particular that generates the most fear and presents the greatest challenges for strategies 
aimed at deterrence. For those who believe that dying in battle unites them with God,  
there is no fear of retaliation. In fact, for Islamic Fundamentalist, U.S. retaliation against 
Muslim Countries has become part of their strategy as it is what unites them and divides 
us. 
                                                 
22 Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini, Countering the 
New Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 44.  
23 Thomas Hammes, “Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation,” Strategic 
Forum (National Defense University, 2005).  
24 Anonymous, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror (Washington, DC: 
Brassey’s Inc., 2004), 167. 
25 Daniel Benjamin & Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2002).  
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It is the moral and religious principles that motivates radical Islamic 
Fundamentalist and inspires suicide bombers; whose ultimate strategic goal is to increase 
fear by demonstrating extreme commitment to their beliefs. Clark McCauley describes 
this motivation as “a drive to feel a connection with God and the work of God, to feel the 
peace of submission of God’s will. . .”26  
In the case of those engaged in jihad27  “Fear is an act of worship due only to 
God.” Considering McCauley’s psychological assessment of radical Islamic 
Fundamentalist, a different type of deterrence has to be considered to influence the 
actions of what now seems to be our greatest threat.   
McCauley’s theory is consistent with, if not supported by, the argument posed by 
Roxanne Euben who argues against the “rational actor” theory of terrorism. Euben 
contends that for Islamic Fundamentalist “there is no separation between religion and 
politics for Islam.” Therefore, these fundamentalist are operating under the belief that 
they are in fact engaged in a battle for “good versus evil” as described by McCauley. As a 
result, it is the fundamentalist belief that those that operate outside of the Islamic Law 
(the Qur’an) can only be cured of such ignorance through divine authority; or the 
employment of a holy war (jihad).28 Thus it appears that even if retaliation were possible 
it would not serve as a deterrent rather it would further the goal of the fundamentalist as 
they would view retaliation as a continuation of the holy war.  
It is this shift in organization and motivation that forces us to realize that detection 
and deterrence is no longer the sole responsibility of the FBI and the military on a 
national level, but one that must be addressed at a local level by our uniform police 
officers. One only has to look at the most recent attacks launched by jihadist in Madrid 
and London to realize that we must adapt to this new kind of threat and develop a layered 
                                                 
26 Clark McCauley, “Psychological Issues in Understanding Terrorism and the Response to 
Terrorism,” The Psychology of Terrorism Vol. 3, ed. Chris Stout (Westport, CT: Pareger, 2002), 3-30. 
27 Quranic definitions of jihad equate to, “Struggle against oppression.” The greatest jihad is said to be 
the internal jihad against sin. Today it has become synonymous with violent aggression justified by Islamic 
religious Fatwa against the West. See John Esposito, “The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?” (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995) 28.   
28 Euben, Roxanne, “When Worldviews Collide: Conflicting Assumptions about Human Behavior 
Held by Rational Actor Theory and Islamic Fundamentalism,” Political Psychology, Vol. 16. No. 1 (1995).  
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system for strategic prevention that reaches down to the local level. Otherwise we may 
find ourselves policing in an “urban battlefield” as we move into the 21st Century.  
2. Growing Domestic Threats 
The motivations of the Islamic Fundamentalist, although predominant in our 
vision since 9-11, are not the only motivations that present a threat to the former 
tranquility of the United States. The potential for mass casualty attacks by domestic terror 
groups are not widely recognized outside of the law enforcement community, but remind 
us that there are others among us that are equally committed and must be considered in 
the development of our prevention strategy.29 
Despite our growing feeling of insecurity, we have been dealing with terrorism in 
the United States for decades and the potential for mass casualties - equivalent to or 
greater than September 11th - has existed for many years. In fact, in 1999 members of the 
San Joaquin County Militia (SJCM) conspired to destroy two propane tanks in Northern 
California that were part of the largest above-ground propane facility in North America. 
Had this group succeeded in the attack it is anticipated that the explosion would have 
killed 12, 000 and the resultant fire would have caused 3rd degree burns in a five-mile 
radius.30  
3. The Patriot Movement 
Having been identified as “the greatest threat of domestic terrorism to the United 
States at the end of the 20th Century,”31 America’s anti-government Patriot movement 
has captured only periodic attention from the general public.  
Aside from the most notorious acts of a few single actors, the various factions of 
the modern-day Patriot movement have not generated much fear among the general 
populace despite their potential for mass-casualty attacks.   But the motivations and goals 
of these domestic extremist groups are drastically different than those of al Qaeda; thus 
requiring different tactics for detection and deterrence. 
                                                 
29 August Kreis, “Aryan Nation Leader Reaches Out to al Qaeda,” 
[http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/005546.php] accessed March 30, 2005. 
30 John Jay College of Criminal Justice, “Targeting Gremlins First, Then Terrorists,” Law 
Enforcement News Vol. 524 (December 1999). 
31 B. Levin, “The Patriot Movement: Past, Present and Future,” The Future of Terrorism, ed. Harvey 
Kushner (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1998), 97-131. 
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Once again, retaliatory responses to acts of terrorism by these groups can often be 
counter-productive to our mission of deterrence.  Memorialized in the words of Patriot 
zealot Chris Temple, when referring to the “Weaver tragedy” at Ruby Ridge; “All of us 
in our groups…could not have done in the next 20 years, what the federal government did 
for our cause in 11 days in Naples, Idaho.”32 
Groups of extremist like the SJCMT and the Patriot Movement number in the 
hundreds throughout the United States. They exist in prisons, remote rural areas and in 
large cities. Research by the Anti-Defamation League has demonstrated that hate and 
extremism is never static and includes both domestic and international groups.33 These 
examples should remind us that a number of terror attacks have been planned and in 
some cases carried out, by American citizens in the United States in recent years. 
4. Networks Expanding 
There is growing evidence that terror groups are expanding their networks to 
include the resources of our homegrown criminal organizations and gangs.34 Studies have 
shown there are increasing numbers of Muslim converts being recruited in our prison 
systems and universities creating a potentially deadly pool of resources for 
fundamentalist seeking to carryout future attacks.  And while many of these converts will 
never cross the line to extremist tactics, they may serve as an unwitting resource for 
fundamentalists who are seeking weapons and resources for future attacks.  
Whether foreign or domestic, religious or ideologically-motivated terrorists do 
have some commonalities that allow them to plan, obtain resources and prepare to carry 
out their attacks. An effective strategy must redefine traditional roles and capabilities of 
our local police officers to establish multiple layers of prevention through detection and 
deterrence at all levels. We can no longer ignore the fact that there are terrorists who live 
among us and we must concentrate on reducing our vulnerabilities at the local level.  
                                                 
32 Levin, The Future of Terrorism, 97. 
33 ADL Website [http://www.adl.org/main_hate_crimes.asp.], accessed July 16, 2005. 
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III. EMPHASIZING PREVENTION 
A. IDENTIFYING INDICATORS 
As was the case with all of the groups cited above, most of today’s terrorist will 
live in and move about in our local communities for some time before launching an 
attack, gathering and assembling a variety of resources locally. In most cases, these 
resources will not be obtained in close proximity to the attack itself, but outside of the 
target area.  
In order to carry out an attack, the terrorist must have certain resources; shelter, 
transportation, communication, funding, and weapons (or the resources necessary to 
make weapons). With each of these activities comes an opportunity for police officers, 
correctional officers, sheriffs deputies, park rangers or private security officers to come 
into contact with the attacker before the attack occurs. The same is true for security 
personnel from universities, hospitals, hotels and amusement parks, who will also have 
opportunities to recognize subtle activities that may indicate that something is out of 
place and may warrant further investigation. At the same token, it may be a local business 
or particular industry that notices something that is out of the ordinary through 
interactions with potential terrorist operatives as they move about collecting the resources 
needed to carry out an attack. Therefore, local law enforcement must enhance both 
internal and external capabilities to detect these activities through the use of efficient 
networks. 
B. STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL PREVENTION 
Developing a law enforcement prevention strategy begins by defining the term 
“prevention” and understanding the context in which it will be used in the strategy. 
Although the term prevention implies that the actions taken by police will ensure that 
future attacks will never occur, this is unrealistic. Like with crime prevention, the more 
realistic view of terrorism prevention should be considered as “law enforcement’s best 
effort to minimize the possibility of an attack occurring.” One must keep in mind that the 
expectations that are established both internally and externally must be realistic and 
achievable or the consequence will be failure; either in terms of internal effort to engage 
in the activity or external support for the activities. Therefore, “preventing terror attacks” 
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must be considered in terms of reducing the fear and damage that terrorist are able to 
inflict on the community. This can only be accomplished through the establishment of 
effective internal and external prevention networks among the law enforcement 
community.     
In terms of activities, the objectives for the law enforcement prevention network 
will take the form of preventive actions aimed at detection, which will be strategically 
focused; or deterrence, which will be tactically focused.  
1. Detection: A Strategic Focus 
Detection will be based on the daily activities of every police officer. Assignment 
to patrol, criminal investigations, communications, or narcotics enforcement, is 
irrelevant; the idea is to understand how detecting terrorist activities fits into each 
officer’s daily responsibilities. This understanding starts at the agency level; i.e., what is 
the agency’s mission focus; transportation security, highway safety, campus security, 
etc., and continues to the micro level of understanding how it fits into each officer’s daily 
duties; i.e., patrol, narcotics, investigations, etc.   
2. Deterrence – Tactical Focus 
Deterrence, on the other hand, is more tactically focused and will be used to 
secure specific locations or events based on an analysis of risk and potential 
consequences. Increasing physical security measures and the visibility of police officers 
around potential terror targets forces the terrorist to change their behavior and sends a 
message that the risk of failure is greater than their commitment to a specific target. This 
concept, suggested by Davis and Jenkins in 2002, encompasses deterrence through an 
increased risk of failure. When one realizes that changing the motivations and 
commitment of terrorist may not be possible, changing the possibility of their success 
may be. “Even hardened terrorists dislike operational risks and may be deterred by 
uncertainty and risk.”35 The patience and years of extensive planning demonstrated by al 
Qaeda seems to support this hypothesis. 
What is most appealing about this theory is that it seems to apply equally to all 
terrorist organizations; including Islamic Fundamentalist. “While they may be committed 
                                                 
35 Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2002), 4. 
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to God and willing to die to further their holy war, they also realize that their power 
depends on perceptions of whether they are winning or losing and a stymied mission 
lacks the appeal of dying in a spectacular, successful attack.”36   
Therefore, law enforcement officials must now strategically rethink public 
security procedures and practices in order to maximize the full potential of their resources 
at certain locations and during certain events.  
C. UNDERSTANDING THE TERRORIST CONTINUUM 
Effective policing has always required the flexibility to adapt to new criminal 
trends and threats. Over the past few decades officers have continually demonstrated this 
ability as they have learned to recognize and respond to the emergence of new threats; the 
unpredictable violence associated with the crack cocaine era and complexity of 
navigating through hazardous methamphetamine labs serve as good examples. Similarly, 
the effectiveness of local police officers in preventing terror attacks will be contingent 
upon their understanding of terrorist motivations and tactics. Although terrorism is, in 
one sense, a bit more complex than traditional crime, understanding terrorist tactics is 
much less complicated when examined in the context of traditional criminal activity. 
Regardless of the motivations, carrying out a terrorist attack will require the operators to 
engage in certain activities before the attack that can be detected by local police. Figure 1 
depicts those activities as operational stages in “continuum of activities” necessary to 
initiate an attack. 
The “Continuum” illustrates the stages of activities that will likely occur from the 
moment a decision is made to carryout an attack, highlighting the series of decisions and 
actions that must take place for the attacker to be successful. A former Israeli Intelligence 
Officer describes a similar continuum of activities that are carried out by nations planning 
attacks on opposing countries.  
Once attack planning begins the opportunities for detection by the opposing 
country increases. For example, military intelligence agencies in the targeted country will 
monitor and may recognize subtle changes in the activities of the adversary that may 
include; increases in the movement of military resources and personnel, the stockpiling or 
                                                 
36 Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism, xii. 
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movement of medical and blood supplies to hospitals along with other subtle, but obvious 
indicators that an adversary may be planning to strike. 37   
With each activity that moves the attacker closer to the actual strike, the subtle 
activities become increasingly more susceptible to interception by the targeted country - 
at least until they reach a certain point, then the opportunities for intervention (or in this 
case detection) decrease. Once planning and preparation has reached a certain stage, the 
strategic opportunities to detect and pre-empt the adversary is lost and defensive/deterrent 
measures must be considered (tactical opportunities). 









Figure 1. The Terrorist Attack Continuum 
 
 Intentions - Attack Conceived: At the point when the attack is conceived, it 
is likely that there is just one person, or a limited number of people who are 
aware of the intent to attack. This limits opportunities for detection through 
infiltration due to the limited number of operators with knowledge of the 
attack. At this stage, the goal of intelligence is knowing who the potential 
adversaries are and understanding their vision, intentions and capabilities. 
Timothy McVeigh and Osama bin Laden are good examples. Both made their 
hatred for the U.S. Government known and openly expressed a desire to attack 
or kill Americans.38 Once the leader clarifies his intentions, he will bring in 
                                                 
37 Yoram Hessel, Israeli Mossad (retired), Former Director, Global Operations, Intelligence and 
Foreign Relations (Lecture, January 2004).  
38 Bin Laden’s Fatwa 1998 and McVeigh’s discussions with friends and family members about 
retaliating against government for Ruby Ridge.  
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other actors, typically his closest confidants, and the opportunities for 
intelligence begin to expand. 
 Decisions - Recruiting/Relocation: During this stage, intentions are being 
translated into strategic decisions and initial movement begins. Due to the 
decentralized structure and network capabilities of today’s terrorist 
movement, terror attacks are not carried out from afar. In most cases, the 
attackers will have to reside within the United States, at least temporarily, 
before an attack can take place. During this time the attacker may relocate 
closer to the target and attempt to recruit or meet with other operatives that 
will assist in the attack.  
 Preparation - Scouting/Surveillance: Preparation requires collaboration and 
draws in more people increasing intelligence opportunities. Travel and the use 
of temporary resources such as rental vehicles, apartments, hotels and 
mailboxes may also be indicators. Even if a particular target has been selected, 
there must be some surveillance or reconnaissance of the target carried out by 
the attacker. They must assess the most effective means of attack and survey 
the current conditions to identify obstacles that may hamper their operation. 
During this stage, video taping, photographing, and inquiries, will likely be 
carried out, putting the attackers in close proximity to the actual target for 
significant periods of time. Early warning indicators will likely be present and 
detectable.   
 Movement - Gathering Resources: The resources needed include shelter, 
transportation, financing, communications and weapons. Since travel and 
border security make it difficult to import most of the resources needed to 
carry out a major attack, the activities in this stage become even more 
vulnerable to detection. Interactions with local businesses, service industries 
and licensing agencies will increase early warning indicators.   
 Coordination - Preparation/weapons: During this stage, the activity will 
include training, increased communication within the group, and the 
preparation of the weapon(s) that will be used. Even if initial training and 
communications took place previously, there will likely be additional 
coordination among the group as the attack plan progresses. The group must 
physically synchronize their actions and prepare weapons that will be used. If 
explosives are to be used, there must be a time and place to assemble or 
prepare them, if vehicles are to be used, the appropriate training and licensing 
must be secured, if access to certain areas will be needed additional resources 
may need to be obtained.   
 Dry Run: In the final stages of preparation the attackers must verify that the 
conditions that may affect the attack have not changed. This may involve a 
final rehearsal of coordinated actions, timing of activities surrounding the 
target, or last minute surveillance of security or other potential barriers that 
will hamper the final attack plan. If warning indicators have been detected, 
defensive actions or pre-emption are the only options at this stage. Tactical 
deterrence measures may minimize or divert successful attack.    
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 Attack: Once the final plan is set into motion the opportunities for detection 
have passed and effective response will be critical to minimize and mitigate 
the damage of the attack.  
Although these stages may not occur in precise order, they do allow some 
perspective of spatial considerations for detection opportunities in terms of attack 
preparation. However, when these stages are graphed geographically, an additional 
dimension is added for offensive strategies aimed at prevention. Figure 2 considers the 
use of these stages in terms of where they may occur in relationship to the potential 
target, adding an element of risk-based analysis that can be applied to the types of 





Figure 2. Activity Detection Areas  
 
Using the Attack Continuum and the Activity Detection Areas the role for local 
law enforcement becomes more defined allowing individual agencies to focus prevention 




jurisdiction. However, strategic coordination between agencies must still be clarified. The 
next chapter delves into the specific measures that can be used to facilitate that 
coordination.   
Enhancing the skills of our police officers must begin with a realistic look at the 
current threat environment, with an eye towards identifying the most appropriate role for 
law enforcement officers across the country with regard to prevention through detection 
and deterrence. We must expand our efforts beyond preparing for response in major cities 
or we may miss the important indicators in our smaller more rural communities.  
D. OPPORTUNITIES MISSED 
A brief look back at the known activities and behaviors of terrorists that have 
been successful in carrying out major attacks within the United States reveals potential 
indicators that may have been detected by state and local law enforcement had they 
realized the degree of the threat and known what to look for. Although we now have the 
benefit of hindsight, one must wonder if any of these attacks could have been prevented 
had state and local police officers had a better understanding of terrorism and their role in 
prevention before the attacks of September 11, 2001; or before April 19, 1995; or before 
February 26, 1993?  
As we will see, there were many opportunities for intervention by law 
enforcement, corrections and private security in the weeks and months leading up to all 
of these attacks. What follows is a summary of what is known about activities terrorists 
were able to carry out in our local communities before these deadly attacks.  
1. The 1993 World Trade Center Bombing & Holland Tunnel Plot  
Mohammed Salameh, one of the key players in the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing, rented the Ryder truck used to carry the bomb, from Jersey City, the day before 
the attack. Salameh later reported the truck stolen and called the rental office in an 
attempt to get his $400.00 deposit back. Nidal Ayyad, another accomplice, acquired the 
chemicals for the bomb locally and mixed them in a rented garage. Both Ahmad Ajaj and 
Ramzi Yousef had traveled around the United States for years using false identification 
documents; a crime for which Ajaj had been arrested in New York in 1992.39  
                                                 
39 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: The 9/11 Commission Report 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004).  
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Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the mastermind of the 1993 attack had been living 
in New York since 1990. Rahman, an extremist Sunni Muslim Cleric, also masterminded 
another plot to bomb major landmarks and tunnels in New York just four months later.  
In the second plot, while planning attacks on the United Nations Building and the 
Lincoln and Holland Tunnels in New York, the terrorist spent time training with 
automatic assault weapons at a public Long Island rifle range. They also made several 
visits to a known terrorist in Attica Prison to plot additional attacks and assassinations. 
They rented a safe-house (garage) in Queens that would later be used to construct bombs 
and continued to meet other operatives regularly at local Mosques. They were able to 
obtain handguns, stun guns and detonators as well as fraudulent passports and birth 
certificates within the United States. In one case, they were even able to obtain the 
itinerary of a visiting head of state that they had planned to assassinate. They traveled in 
rented vehicles on numerous occasions to survey and videotape targets and traffic 
patterns around New York’s Lincoln and Holland Tunnels as well as the United Nations 
Building. They purchased multiple 55 gallon drums from a drum company in Newark, 
New Jersey and traveled to a gas station in Yonkers to fill the drums with diesel fuel. 
They purchased timing devices from a store in Chinatown (NY) and large quantities of 
fertilizer from the suburbs.40 They also made several unsuccessful attempts to purchase 
stolen cars from local criminals for use as getaway vehicles after the attack.41  
Yousef and Ajaj also prepared and carried with them what has come to be known 
as the “terrorist kit” that contained; bomb making manuals, operations guidance manuals 
and video tapes advocating terrorist acting against the United States. 
2. 1995 Attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Building, Oklahoma City 
Although Timothy McVeigh would be considered a “lone-wolf” terrorist, his 
motivations and obsessions were fueled by the writings of known white supremist 
William Peirce, in the Turner Diaries.42 McVeigh and his accomplice, Terry Nichols, 
                                                 
40 United States v. Rahman, 189 F3d88, 104 (2d Cir. 1999). 
41 Several attempts were made to purchase stolen cars to be used as getaway vehicles but the group 
did not have sufficient funds to complete the transaction. 
42 The Turner Diaries describe a revolution that takes place through anti-government attacks and the 
use of guerrilla tactics directed at the U.S. Government.  
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traveled through several states including Texas, Michigan and Kansas as they prepared 
for the attack, gathering resources and interacting with businesses, friends and strangers. 
In the months leading up to the bombing McVeigh and Nichols were able to accomplish 
the following as they planned and prepared for the attack. 
Beginning in September, 1994, McVeigh began gathering his resources for the 
attack on the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, starting with the purchase of more than 
4,000 pounds43 of ammonium nitrate44 from a mid-Kansas cooperative using the alias 
“Mike Havens.” He and accomplice Terry Nichols continued preparations by stealing 
seven cases of Tovex45 explosives and a box of non-electric blasting caps from the 
Martin Marietta rock quarry near Marion, Kansas.46 McVeigh then purchased three 
drums of nitro-methane47 from an auto race track outside of Dallas, Texas and rented 
numerous storage lockers in Kansas to store bomb components. Short on cash to fund the 
attack, McVeigh robbed a local gun dealer in Arkansas.  
He also created and carried with him a diagram of how he would rig the 
explosives and carryout the attack on the Murrah Building, allegedly showing it to others 
periodically. He typed a number of anti-government letters and warned friends and 
family members that he planned to take action against the federal government in 
retaliation for the siege at Waco.48 In the later stages of his planning, McVeigh made 
several trips to the Murrah Building to determine what size truck he could use to place 
the explosives in the most vulnerable point of the building. Associates of McVeigh report 
that he purchased numerous books that described how to make bombs and encouraged 
self-declared patriots to blow up federal buildings.49  
                                                 
43 There is widespread disagreement about the amount of ammonium nitrate McVeigh actually used. 
Estimates vary between 4,000 and 7,000 pounds.  
44 Ammonium nitrate is commonly sold as a fertilizer but when mixed with the appropriate fuel oil 
(ANFO) it becomes one of the most commonly used ingredients for making improvised explosive devices.  
45 Tovex is a gel-based high-explosive manufactured by DuPont. 
46 Marion, Kansas is approximately 225 miles from Oklahoma City. 
47 Nitro-methane is a racing fuel that can be used to mix with ammonium nitrate to create a 
supercharged explosive. 
48 Referring to the ATF raid of the Branch Davidian Ranch in Waco, Texas in April, 1993. 
49 U.S. v McVeigh, Retrieved from [www.fas.org/irp/threat/mcveigh/overview.htm].  
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McVeigh spent much of his time in motel rooms as he traveled from state-to-state 
gathering resources, spending several days in a Junction City, Kansas motel just prior to 
the attack. It was from this room that he placed several calls to various truck rental 
companies to secure the one-way rental of the Ryder truck from Junction City to 
Oklahoma.50 He picked up the Ryder truck using an alias and fake South Dakota driver’s 
license.  
Just four days before the attack, he purchased his getaway vehicle at the Junction 
City, Firestone and parked in an alley just a few blocks from the Murrah Building without 
any tags. Realizing this may come to the attention of the local police, McVeigh attached a 
note to the window stating “Not abandoned; Please do not tow; will move by April 23 
(needs battery and cable).” The vehicle remained parked in that location until the 
attack.51  
3. The 2001 Attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon 
Most of the 19 terror operatives from the 2001 attack lived in and traveled around 
the United States at various times over the previous several years;52 however, the 
following timeline will focus on the months leading up to the actual attack to highlight 
the operational stages that are most vulnerable to detection. Although attack organizers 
Hazmi and Mihdhar arrived in Los Angeles53 in January 2000, 14 of the 15 “muscle 
hijackers” did not arrive in the United States until June of 2001.  
Hazmi and Mihdhar posed as Saudi students and spent a considerable amount of 
time in Culver City, California, living in a strong Muslim community, seeking assistance 
from local Mosques. They stayed at numerous hotels between Los Angeles and            
San Diego and attended planning meetings with other operatives at local restaurants.54 
They frequently met with and attempted to recruit local university students from other 
                                                 
50 It is nearly 300 miles from Junction City, Kansas to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. 
51 M. Lou and D. Herveck,  American Terrorist (New York: Regan Books, 2001), 47.  
52 The 9/11 Commission Report, 215. 
53 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the organizer of the attack, related that California was a convenient 
point of entry from Asia and had the added benefit of being far away from the intended target area. 
54 Predominately restaurants in Muslim dominated communities (like Culver City) and located near 
Mosques. 
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Muslim countries. Over the course of several months, they rented apartments,55 opened 
bank accounts, obtained California and Virginia Driver’s Licenses and applied for 
language and flight schools.  
As other 9-11 operatives entered the plot, the group was clearly able to move 
about the United States undetected as they engaged in unusual activities. For example, it 
is known that the operatives attended numerous flight training schools, often expressing 
their desire to begin training by learning to fly jets (Boeing aircraft in particular), often 
asking different flight schools56 where they could find a program that would skip the 
small aircraft flight training. As flight students they were noted as “poor students who 
showed no interest in take off and landing procedures.” They were also described by 
some flight instructors as aggressive and rude during instruction, fighting to take over the 
controls of the aircraft. Additionally, at least some of the operatives were known to have 
taken multiple cross country surveillance flights, including a unique test flight along the 
Hudson Corridor.57  
They traveled by car frequently between Newark, New Jersey and New York and 
between Arizona and California, sharing apartments with flight instructors and renting 
single engine planes.  
Eventually, most operatives purchased used vehicles, and several were able to 
obtain private pilots licenses. Several of the operatives were known to have established 
residences in Falls Church, Alexandria and Virginia Beach, Virginia,58 as well as in 
Patterson, New Jersey and Connecticut. They secured several rental mailboxes in various 
suburban areas and frequently attended Mosques in rural suburban areas including 
Northern Virginia, Connecticut and New Jersey.  
                                                 
55 Hazmi and Mihdhar first attempted to pay for the apartment in cash but the leasing agent would not 
accept cash payment. The pair lived in the apartment with virtually no furniture and very few possessions. 
56 Known flight schools include Sarasota and Venice, Florida; Mesa, Arizona; San Diego, California. 
Both Atta and Al-Shehhi received flight training in Venice, Fla., Tampa, Fla., and Miami after visiting a 
flight school in Norman, Okla. The same school provided entry flight training to Zacarias Moussaoui, who 
had been detained in Minnesota since mid-August after he aroused suspicions by seeking training on a 
simulator to fly--but not land--passenger jets.   
57 The Hudson Corridor is a low-altitude ‘hallway’ along the Hudson River that passes New York 
landmarks like the World Trade Center. 
58 The 9/11 Commission Report, 253. 
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At least one of the operatives was encountered on a traffic stop by local law 
enforcement in April 2001, in Broward County Florida. Several of the operatives stayed 
in various suburban Washington hotels from August through September 10, 2001, and 
attempted, on at least one occasion, to use a bad credit card to purchase an official Air 
Force Magazine at the Government Printing Office in Washington, D.C.59 
After 9-11, it was revealed that the operatives repeatedly visited a fertilizer 
company in Belle Glade, Fla., (inquiring about the use of crop dusters); and continually 
attempted to recruit additional operatives from local universities and Mosques. They used 
traveler’s checks for numerous purchases60 and opened bank accounts, rented cars and 
mailboxes, joined local gyms, stayed in hotels and motels, rented apartments, and 
traveled to resorts.61  
E. A CLEAR ROLE FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
In many cases, such as those cited above, terrorist will have some contact with, or 
be known by, local law enforcement well before an attack occurs. And in all cases, the 
attackers will need to purchase, lease or steal the resources they needed from local 
businesses or industry. Most will, at some point, obtain and possess fraudulent 
identification or other legal documents needed to assist them in concealing their identity. 
Other detectable commonalities include the use of motel rooms, rental vehicles, 
temporary mailboxes, storage facilities, apartments and bank accounts; frequent travel on 
major roadways; interaction and recruiting attempts at local universities, Mosques and 
correctional facilities; frequent and unusual interactions or requests from businesses that 
offer training, licensing, services, rental vehicles and storage facilities. These known facts 
demonstrate a host of activities that are potentially detectable by state and local law 
enforcement and private security if they know what to look for.   
These examples demonstrate that the openness of our democratic society and the 
ease of transportation does not limit terrorist to large urban areas within the United 
                                                 
59 David Peace, “One Suspect Emerges as Group’s ‘Pied Piper’,” Sun Times, September 26, 2001.  
60 Nearly $50,000 in traveler’s checks were used in the United States; The 9/11 Commission Report, 
237. 
61 Shehri traveled to Las Vegas, and the Princess Resort in Freeport Bahamas; The 9/11 Commission 
Report, 242. 
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States. While terrorists may target large urban areas, they typically mobilize, plan, secure 
resources and deploy from out of the way rural locations. This fact reinforces our need to 
expand our detection capabilities by ensuring that every police officer in the United 
States fully understands their role and is engaged in our national efforts to prevent future 
attacks. Without the support of these officers, who work in our communities every day 
interacting with hundreds of thousands of motorists, tourist, victims and criminals we are 
not putting our best efforts forth. The value added by using these additional “eyes and 
ears” as a force multiplier far surpass any effort that could be accomplished by the 11,800 
Federal Law Enforcement agents62 around the country when it comes to detecting 
terrorist activity before an attack occurs. The value of the unique skills and abilities of 
local police officers in making the connections between the seemingly innocuous 
activities of the terrorists highlighted above are enumerated in the following section. 
1. The Discoverers  
Police officers are skilled at discovery. They are extremely efficient at 
recognizing subtle activities that indicate something is “out of the ordinary” in the 
communities that they serve. Due to the nature of their duties, police officers typically 
develop a keen “sense” or perception that allows them to apprehend offenders, 
investigate and solve crimes and most importantly, survive. This sixth sense is a 
combination of experience, familiarity and survival skills that are inherent in what they 
do.  
Having been described as “long periods of boredom interrupted by brief moments 
of intense fear” a police officer’s daily routine builds the essential qualities needed to 
enhance our prevention efforts. While the majority of a police officers’ day may be spent 
patrolling familiar areas, conducting routine and sometimes redundant activities, they 
quickly become skilled at recognizing what is “normal” about the people and places they 
patrol, creating a mental map of what is “ordinary.” As they gain experience these mental 
acuities become increasingly sensitive to slight changes in the environment or behaviors 
of the people with which they interact.  
                                                 
62 This number represents the total deployment of law enforcement agents working for the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 
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Much like the skilled “career criminal,” good police officers learn all of the subtle 
nuances that create opportunities for criminals and predators seeking to infiltrate their 
communities and they act strategically to reduce those vulnerabilities. This phenomenon 
applies equally throughout the police organization as officers from patrol, narcotics and 
investigations develop extraordinary skills that make them successful in fulfilling their 
mission. For example, experienced patrol officers will recognize subtle differences in 
how a person concealing a weapon walks; his gait, arm movements, hand placement and 
clothing.63 They can detect when a person they have stopped is about to flee or launch an 
assault through slight changes in eye movements, perspiration and breathing patterns. 
While on routine patrol they notice people or things that are out of place, using a rapid, 
almost simultaneous assessment that considers the time of day, location, 
appearance/clothing, or actions; which often provide opportunities to prevent or disrupt  
burglaries or property theft.  
Through training and experience traffic enforcement officers on a routine traffic 
stop will instinctively look for potential indicators that an occupant may be concealing 
something or possibly pose a threat to the officer or community. As they approach the 
stopped vehicle, they look to see if the vehicle is in gear, or if the break lights are 
illuminated, indicating the potential flight of the motorist. They observe the body 
language and hand movements of the occupants, anticipating signs of potential danger 
that will allow them time to take cover or defend themselves from an attack.   
Narcotics officers have mastered the complex methods and tactics used by drug 
organizations and understand how they communicate, travel, conceal narcotics and 
establish markets. Criminal investigators conducting an interrogation quickly adjust their 
techniques to manipulate suspects by capitalizing on their strengths and weaknesses. 
Good police investigators can almost instinctively read deception in an interrogation and 
can follow the smallest shreds of evidence to track perpetrators involved in nearly any 
crime. 
                                                 
63 In the mid 1990s law enforcement officers began training programs on how to identify an armed 
gunman based on subtle differences in body language and clothing.  
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These examples of law enforcement adaptation demonstrates that for years police 
officers have become extremely efficient at developing the expertise needed to meet and 
overcome new challenges and threats posed by criminals. Thus the inclusion of subtle 
activities detection of potential terrorist activities does not represent an insurmountable 












































IV. PUBLIC POLICY AND PUBLIC VALUE 
A. NATIONAL AND LOCAL CHALLENGES 
The most significant challenge to local law enforcement is rooted in traditional 
public policy in that local priorities must trickle down from federal priorities. This should 
not, and does not have to be the case when it comes to the National Strategy. Although it 
was developed at the federal level, it was done so with the stated purpose of including 
“all levels of government, the private sector and the American people;”64 a theme that is 
common in each of the national strategic documents that have been produced by the 
Department of Homeland Security and endorsed by the President over the past three 
years.   
1. National Level: National vs. Local Priorities 
At the national level intelligence sharing and response preparedness have been the 
focal points for government reform since 9-11. Logically, these priorities are driven by 
what issues have the greatest public value, i.e., information sharing is important because 
people want to feel they are informed of potential threats so they can act to protect 
themselves; just as the emphasis on response is driven by society’s need to know that our 
first responders will have the ability to rescue them should another attack occur. 
Prevention, on the other hand, is an invisible quantity that means “nothing happens” to 
impact peoples lives and thus demands no attention. Unfortunately, prevention can not be 
measured and therefore doesn’t register or have public value when compared to the 
tangible, “what’s in it for me” element associated with information and response. While 
this mentality is understandable, it leaves us in the dangerous position that no one is 
focusing on prevention at the local level which ignores the “lessons learned” about the 
success of al Qaeda and many other terror groups that have been successful in the past.   
This pressure has in turn filtered down to local law enforcement leaders who are 
focusing on ensuring they have access to terrorist-related intelligence and the ability to 
respond more effectively to mass-casualty terrorist attacks. While local police leaders 
across the country continue to fight for security clearances, information, and funding for 
                                                 
64 National Strategy for Homeland Security, vii. 
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response equipment, these issues seem to be the only ones getting political, economic and 
community support. As a result, law and policy makers are developing new strategies and 
allocating budgets around these two principals and millions of dollars are being made on 
selling response equipment to law enforcement agencies around the country.  
At the national level federal budgets continue to focus on preparing for response, 
which stimulates economic growth, while focusing on prevention does not offer the same 
benefit.65 More importantly, with the vast majority of federal funding focused on 
response and recovery a strong message is being sent that prevention is not valued or 
necessary at the local level.  
2. Local Level: Changing Perceptions 
At the local level, law enforcement strategies and budgets are driven by what 
stakeholders feel are important at the community level and ultimately tie into only those 
things the community feels their local police are responsible for; and preventing terror 
attacks is not one of them. The average American citizen is more afraid of becoming the 
victim of a robbery than they are of being the victim of a terrorist attack. As far as they 
are concerned, the local police are responsible for protecting them from criminals, while 
the military and the federal government (FBI, DHS, and CIA) are responsible for 
protecting them from terrorists; thus there is no public support for local law enforcement 
efforts in terrorism prevention or homeland security. As far as local budgets are 
concerned preparing for response brings federal funding while focusing on prevention 
will only add to the strain on scarce personnel resources.   
Unfortunately the reality is, if local law enforcement leaders are unable to 
convince key stakeholders that terrorism detection, deterrence and prevention are 
important elements of the law enforcement mission, strategies will not evolve and 
budgets will not be adjusted to include the crucial elements necessary to counter the 
external threats.66 
 
                                                 
65 Christopher Bellavita, “What’s Preventing Homeland Security?” Homeland Security Affairs 1 (July 
2005): 17. 
66 The average tenure of a Police Chief in the United States is three to five years based largely on 
political and constituent support. Command Performance, Police Executive Research Forum (1998).  
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B. CONSIDERATIONS 
The field of homeland security is so broad and encompasses so many different 
disciplines the best bet for a comprehensive approach would be to develop components 
for each discipline across all levels of government that can later be integrated into the 
larger homeland security system.  
As with all strategies developed in a public domain, it is essential that three 
critical elements are considered during development. First, there must be critical thought 
in determining what would be valuable and effective at the national and local level. In 
this context, that means creating a prevention strategy that supports the National Strategy 
and will be useful to all law enforcement agencies at the local level, regardless of size or 
location.  
The strategy must also consider the public/political expectations and 
consequences. This is particularly important at the community level, as we prepare to 
engage our law enforcement officers in an offensive strategy that is directed at an 
adversary that may be politically or religiously motivated. There are a myriad of sensitive 
issues that relate to the delicate balance between liberty and security that must be 
considered and integrated into the philosophy of the strategy.  
Lastly, there must be an analysis and determination of operational feasibility that 
will be sustainable over time.  The later being the most difficult considering the demands 
of traditional law enforcement activities that will not diminish in the future.67 Operational 
plans developed to support the National Strategy cannot be too complex or lengthy, 
making them impossible to digest otherwise they will sit on a shelf and not be used. 
Additionally, they must clearly define roles and responsibilities for all agencies that take 
into consideration the consequences of actions taken on surrounding jurisdictions.68  
                                                 
67 In fact, traditional demands on local law enforcement may increase with the new prevention 
strategy as the reporting of suspicious activity increases. Follow up on additional suspicious activity 
reporting will also increase demand.  
68 In 2003, it was discovered that the U.S. Capitol Police Department in Washington, D.C. had 
prepared and implemented an emergency plan that included closing off major arteries that had been 
designated as Emergency Evacuation Routes by the Metropolitan Police Department. This created 
significant problems that neither agency was aware of until a crisis arose and confusion set in. See Lyndsey 
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V. BUILDING THE LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY 
A. EXPANDING THE MISSION 
Due to the strong traditional nature of policing, change has always been slow and 
difficult for law enforcement organizations. Historically change has only been excepted 
when the organization or society itself faces a significant threat or crisis; and even then 
changes must be carefully balanced with the political and social needs of the time. The 
attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. in 2001 have certainly illuminated an 
emerging threat that can no longer be ignored, thus ensuring that change will follow. The 
first step in initiating that change is ensuring that police officers understand their 
obligation to prevent terror attacks through their daily interactions with the public. Every 
traffic stop, every citizen contact and every investigation of suspicious activity or crime 
could lead to the identification of a terrorist operator and prevent a potential attack. When 
combined with the existing community oriented policing model practiced by most law 
enforcement agencies this realization will be the impetus for moving to a more secure 
community.    
1. Community Oriented Policing and Today’s Strategy 
With little variation, the core mission of local law enforcement has always been to 
prevent crime, detect criminal activity and apprehend offenders while fostering a sense of 
safety in the community. As law enforcement models have evolved from the political era 
thru Community Oriented Policing, goals have been revised, but the core mission has not 
changed. As we move forward into a new arena of crime fighting that includes terrorism, 
the mission and goals developed during the Community Oriented Policing era have 
provided us with a natural evolution that will make enhancing and the integrating new 
skills easier.  
Although not all law enforcement agencies have fully embraced the Community 
Oriented Policing concept, studies have shown that there is growing recognition for the 
value it brings in terms of reduced crime and fear of crime as well as improved 
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community satisfaction.69 Utilizing the same problem solving philosophy and community 
partnerships, terrorism prevention through detection and deterrence can be integrated into 
police organizations without reducing the emphasis on crime control, order maintenance 
or service to the community.  
2. Leveraging Existing Expertise 
In the simplest terms, terrorism is a crime of violence that is intended to inflict 
casualties in the communities that local law enforcement is sworn to protect. What makes 
it different is the extreme commitment of the perpetrators, who are willing to sacrifice 
themselves in order to carryout elaborate, deadly attacks against large numbers of 
random, unsuspecting civilians. The magnitude and consequences of those attacks on our 
society as a whole also create new dynamics that must be considered. Like other 
criminals, terrorists are becoming increasingly skilled at blending among us as they plan 
these attacks from within our local communities. Therefore detecting the subtle activities 
that may be associated with a potential attack is crucial.  
Clearly, the opportunities for detection and deterrence during the planning stages 
of an attack are numerous and should be recognized by every police officer in every 
community. As terrorists carry out surveillance of potential targets and commit crimes to 
create false identities to finance their mission, opportunities are created for local police 
officers to identify and pre-empt even the most dedicated terrorist organizations from 
succeeding in an attack. But the enhanced skills and associated responsibilities should not 
be isolated in “counter-terrorism” or other specialized units.70 The law enforcement 
community as a whole must incorporate terrorism prevention in their missions, goals, 
objectives, training, performance evaluations and all other elements that define the 
culture and activities of their organizations.71   
                                                 
69 U.S. Department of Justice, “Community Policing,” Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services (2001), 22. Between 1997 and 1999, departments employing personnel designated as community 
police rose from 34% to 64%.  
70 Unlike the start of the community oriented policing era where agencies would assign specific 
officers to handle the community policing function while all others continued on with their traditional roles.  
71 Mathew Scheider and Robert Chapman, “Community Policing and Terrorism,” April 2003, 
[http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/scheider-Chapman.html], July, 2005. 
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The Preparedness Guidelines for Homeland Security released in 2003, identified 
five elements of a terrorism prevention strategy: collaboration, information sharing, threat 
recognition, risk management and intervention.72 These five elements correspond with 
the central idea of community policing which fosters a collaborative partnership with the 
community to effectively address the underlying conditions that give rise to crime and 
disorder. In this case, the task is for local law enforcement to enhance those partnerships 
to include public and private agencies through the establishment of a Local Business 
Network. Law enforcement’s partnership with this network will add a new dimension to 
our prevention effort as thousands more “eyes and ears” are added to the national 
network learning to look for and report potential warning indicators.   
 
                                                 
72 Office of Domestic Preparedness, “Guidelines for Homeland Security: Prevention and Deterrence,” 
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VI. THE ROAD MAP 
A. ESTABLISHING NATIONAL STRUCTURE 
The nature of the threat we are facing dictates that we must undergo some 
significant changes in the way we organize and communicate. Ideally, the structure 
should be built from the ground up allowing us to move from individual agency actions, 
to structures that facilitate regional, national and international networks. Creating 
effective conduits for strategic information sharing will be dependent on the structures 
put in place to reach beyond our traditional jurisdictional boundaries.  
Since it is unlikely that we will ever move to a national police force in the United 
States, the development of a national network of state, local and tribal police agencies 
along with private security, will allow law enforcement to be used as a “force multiplier” 
in the global war on terror. The use of this type of network will allow us to maximize 
each agency’s unique skills while harnessing the collective strengths of the law 
enforcement community as a whole.  
The creation of a National Law Enforcement Network (NLEN), much like the 
consolidation of federal agencies into the Department of Homeland Security and the 
centralization of control for intelligence agencies created through the appointment of the 
DNI, will facilitate a more effective unified system that integrates all levels of 
government into the Homeland Security Mission. The structure of the NLEN will assist 
with the development of a unified prevention strategy that is reasonable and appropriate 
for all state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies, regardless of their size or 
jurisdiction. Prevention objectives can then be developed to define roles that are realistic 
and achievable for all departments.  
1. The Principles 
The effectiveness of the National Law Enforcement Network is based on two key 
principles: increasing the ability of state and local officers to detect the subtle activities or 
behaviors that may indicate terrorist activity; and the expansion of existing local 
partnerships that will improve detection and reporting of such activities throughout the 
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business community. The success of both principles will rely on the development of 
effective conduits for centralizing and sharing that information.   
Once established these networks will improve both the internal and external 
capacity of local police agencies that serve as our nation’s front line of defense in the 
fight against terrorism. 
B. MISSION SPECIFIC CLUSTERS 
Organizing more than 18,000 individual police agencies into a structure that will 
enhance the collective efforts of local law enforcement can be accomplished through the 
use of “Mission Specific Clusters” (MSC). The cluster system groups law enforcement 
and private security agencies according to their traditional core competencies and natural 
areas of expertise to more clearly define their role in the prevention strategy. These 
clusters build on the logical similarities that are inherent in each agency’s primary skill 
areas allowing law enforcement leaders to enhance the skills of their police officers 
without eroding the commitment to their community or ignoring the strategic needs of 
their particular agency. Most importantly, the development of these Mission Specific 
Clusters will allow for varying levels of operational functionality that will define the 
roles and expectations of all agencies within a particular cluster, eliminating confusion 
across jurisdictional boundaries. The hope is that the development of this model will 
guide the leadership in implementing a comprehensive strategy that will enable them to 
prepare their agencies to detect terrorist activities and prevent future attacks, making state 
and local law enforcement an active component of the Homeland Security system.  
Although the Mission Specific Clusters were initially designed to assist with the 
implementation of a national prevention strategy, they provide a much needed structure 
that can later be expanded to define the appropriate roles and capabilities in all aspects of 
preparedness including equipment, training and mobilization for response.  
1. The System 
The decision to use “clusters” instead of “tiers” was intended to emphasize that no 
one agency is more important than another when it comes to prevention. It also 
emphasizes that some mission clusters will overlap with others, either geographically or 
operationally as depicted in Figure 3. This will be an important consideration for local 




















Figure 3. National Law Enforcement Network: Mission Specific Clusters  
 
 Regional Metropolitan Agency Cluster (RMAC): This cluster is 
geographically based to include all law enforcement agencies within 50 miles 
of one of the 30 most densely populated cities. This grouping was designed on 
the premise that the most densely populated cities are the most favored for 
attack and often present the biggest challenge for law enforcement in terms of 
reducing vulnerabilities. Agencies in this cluster include; city, county, state, 
townships, sheriffs, park /natural resource, private security, school security, 
university, hospitals, etc.  
 Transportation Agency Cluster (TAC): This cluster includes all law 
enforcement and security responsible for the various modes of transportation 
(excluding commercial airlines). This cluster is “mission based” in that these 
agencies have direct responsibility for securing the transportation sector. This 
cluster overlaps both the RMAC and RAC. The agencies in this cluster 
include: state police/highway patrol, freight and passenger railroad police, 
mass transit and commuter bus or rail police, and transportation and port 
authority police, etc. 
 Rural Agency Cluster (RAC): Similar to the Regional Metropolitan Agency 
Cluster, this cluster is geographically based to include those law enforcement 
and security agencies in remote, rural areas that are outside of the RMAC 





















sheriff’s departments, county and township police departments, tribal police, 
natural resources/wildlife fish and game, park police, etc.  
 Private Security Agency Cluster (PSAC): Similar to the Transportation 
Agency Cluster, this cluster is “mission-based” to include those private 
security and correctional agencies responsible for the following: infrastructure 
protection, colleges and universities, hospitals and public facilities, 
commercial and residential building security, business and industry security, 
as well as corrections/correctional facilities, etc. This cluster has direct 
responsibility for various areas that represent unique opportunities for 
detection of terrorist planning and preparation for potential attacks. 
 
C. EFFECTIVE NETWORKS  
Since terrorism is a global phenomenon that impacts our local communities, the 
key to success for the new NLEN will be creating a mechanism for the SLTLE to gather, 
report and share critical information in all directions; internally among the various units 
within the agency, as well as externally with; other SLTLE agencies in the network, the 
private sector, the federal intelligence community, and ultimately, internationally with 
their counterparts in other regions of the world. Therefore, the initial focus should be on 
establishing intelligence requirements for the SLTLE and creating effective conduits for 
communication. This framework must then be formalized through the development of 
standards, policies, and practices that will reinforce and expedite critical information 
sharing. 
1. Establishing Local Intelligence Requirements  
Ultimately, local law enforcement leaders need information that will guide them 
in developing prevention strategies that set a meaningful direction for the local law 
enforcement community when it comes to the complex issue of dealing with terror and 
extremist networks. This must be done through the establishment of appropriate 
requirements which will serve both the tactical and strategic needs of the NLEN in terms 
of prevention and planning. 
When it comes to intelligence, many law enforcement leaders at the local level are 
unsure exactly what information can/should be collected; what information can/should be 
kept in files; what information can/should be shared and with whom; and most 
importantly, what resources are available to assist them with answering these questions. 
Local law enforcement leaders should not assume that the intelligence requirements for 
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the federal or military agencies are adequate or appropriate for the needs of local police 
agencies. Extreme caution must be used in this area as there are strict rules and 
regulations that separate national security intelligence and criminal intelligence which are 
based on the key missions of the agencies that make up the Intelligence Community and 
the law enforcement community. Most importantly, the intelligence requirements that are 
developed for the SLTLE must be in compliance with CFR 28, Section 23; a regulation 
that most local agencies are completely unaware of.    
2. National Intelligence and Criminal Intelligence 
The agencies that make up the Intelligence Community73 (IC) are responsible for 
gathering and analyzing national intelligence. National intelligence is primarily 
concerned with the relationship between the United States and foreign powers and the 
maintenance of the United States’ sovereign principals. It includes both policy and 
military intelligence that identify nations hostile towards the United States and their 
ability to pose a threat through their weapons systems and warfare capabilities. 74 There is 
no consideration in these requirements for criminal investigations or the constitutional 
restrictions that attach to criminal cases associated with law enforcement intelligence. 
Therefore caution must be used by local law enforcement agencies that are gathering 
intelligence and maintaining files that may subject them to both legal and civil liability in 
the future.75  
3. Intelligence for Prevention and Planning 
In terms of prevention, intelligence is based on gaining or developing information 
related to threats of terrorism or crime that can be used to apprehend offenders, harden 
targets and design strategies to reduce or eliminate threats.76 In large part, this 
information will come from the federal intelligence community through the Department 
                                                 
73 The Intelligence Community (IC) is comprised of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps 
Intelligence Agencies, Central Intelligence Agency, Coast Guard Intelligence, Defense Intelligence 
Agency, Dept. of Energy, Dept. of Homeland Security, Dept. of Treasury, Dept. of State, Federal Bureau of 
Investigations, National Geospatial Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security 
Agency, [www.intelligence.gov], accessed August 14, 2005. 
74 David Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local and Tribal Law Enforcement 
Agencies (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2003), 14. 
75 Methods used to collect NSI likely will not meet the constitutional requirements for a criminal 
prosecution. 
76 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence, 94. 
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of Homeland Security. As our national security agencies develop information on foreign 
terrorist leaders, their motives, tactics and the capabilities of their networks around the 
globe, this information must be shared with local law enforcement so local strategies can 
be adjusted to reduce vulnerabilities at the local level. The same is true for federal law 
enforcement agencies that collect intelligence domestically. There must be a mechanism 
for sharing the appropriate aspects of this information so local law enforcement leaders 
have adequate time to respond offensively.  
Intelligence shared with local law enforcement must also be used strategically for 
planning and resource allocation. This aspect of intelligence will provide information to 
decision makers about the emerging threats for the purpose of developing response 
strategies and reallocating resources to accomplish effective prevention.77  
4. Use of Intelligence and Technology 
The type of intelligence needed in today’s environment goes well beyond the 
“dragnet approach” of traditional law enforcement intelligence units. For years, local law 
enforcement has been gathering large amounts of data on suspects, criminals, and other 
criminal associates and storing them in large databases for future reference. In most 
cases, these systems do not allow for contextual searches or relationship identification 
between key elements of data, nor do they allow for interactive searches between 
jurisdictions.  
Just as emerging technologies led local law enforcement to the CompStat78 era, 
whereby, crime and policing efforts were data driven through the use of timely 
information on crime and criminal activity; this same concept can be used as we move  
into an intelligence led policing model that will improve our ability to fight terrorism 
through the use of regional information on suspicious activity and other terrorist related 
data.  
The availability of technology will drive the evolution of the new intelligence led 
policing model and eliminate the stove-piping of information between agencies. If local 
                                                 
77 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence, 65. 
78 CompStat was developed as a tool for Community Policing and draws its name from Computerized 
Statistics. CompStat uses computerized crime mapping and statistics as a tool to deploy resources more 
efficiently. 
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law enforcement is ever going to be considered a viable component of the Homeland 
Security Mission, they must build the capacity to think “globally and act locally.”79  
The transition to an intelligence led policing model will ensure that all SLTLE, 
private security, and the community are engaged in a comprehensive prevention strategy 
that emphasizes our commitment to the National Strategy.  
D. EXTERNAL NETWORKS 
The establishment of the National Law Enforcement Network (NLEN) provides 
the framework for the expansion of the network to the private sector through the 
development of a Local Business Network (LBN). Just as the Mission Specific Clusters 
serve as components of a National Law Enforcement Network, the Local Business 
Network will establish nationwide lines of communication between our business and 
industry partners and local law enforcement through the Mission Specific Clusters. With 
terror cells operating in our communities, our local businesses and industries may 
unwittingly provide the resources needed to carry out an attack. Therefore including them 
in the prevention network will increase opportunities for detection as well as the 
operational risk to the terrorist.  
Using the Mission Specific Clusters to build this external network will aid in the 
development of an effective national prevention strategy that can be carried out at the 
local level facilitating a seamless integration into the national prevention strategy 
envisioned by the President. 
1. Existing Programs 
State and local police agencies have demonstrated their creativity and agility over 
the years as they have continuously adapted to overcome emerging threats without 
waiting for direction from the federal government. For cities like New York, Washington, 
D.C. and Los Angeles the threat of future attacks was too great to await guidance from 
the Department of Homeland Security. Almost immediately, these agencies implemented 
local terrorism prevention programs that could be integrated into existing activities to 
enhance their ability to detect and prevent future attacks.80  
                                                 
79 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence, 4.  
80 The TEW established in Los Angeles, was actually created in 1996, but since 2001, the program has 
been expanded and will likely be replicated around the country through the UASI grant program.  
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2. Terrorism Prevention Outreach Programs 
Programs like Operation Nexus created by the New York City Police Department 
(NYPD), and Operation TIPP (Terrorist Incident Prevention Program) implemented by 
the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) in Washington D.C., (Appendix A) are based 
on what is known about previous terror attacks within the United States in that certain 
businesses and industries may be exploited by terrorist who portray themselves as 
legitimate customers seeking to purchase, lease or otherwise obtain certain materials, 
licenses and/or services to covertly further a terrorist plot. As demonstrated in all of the 
case studies and through the use of the Terrorist Continuum, these programs educate 
officers on the known activities of terrorist groups and engage them in an outreach 
program that requires personal contact with the local businesses that are most at risk and 
likely to detect conduct or requests that are inconsistent with their experience with 
routine customers.  
3.  The Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW) 
The Terrorist Early Warning Group (TEW) in Los Angeles was originally created 
to “fill a void in information and knowledge about terrorism for local law enforcement 
and public safety agencies.”81 The TEW is a multi-discipline, multi-agency approach that 
provides a local network of public and private agencies that serve multiple fusion 
functions and provide information on; indications and warning, operational assessments,  
and special events with threat potential. The creation of the TEW was one of the first 
major steps towards regional preparedness and will serve as a model for local agencies 
around the country.   
4. Expanding Local Programs through the Network 
These and other programs initiated by local law enforcement agencies of all sizes 
around the country emphasize the importance of using the long-standing relationships 
law enforcement has built with the local communities and the formidable network they 
can create when harnessed in a unified effort. The credibility and trust earned by local 
police leaders over the years demonstrates they are clearly the best suited to lead our 
national prevention efforts. While all of these local programs demonstrate the initiative 
and flexibility of our local police agencies when faced with new threats or changes in the 
                                                 
81 John Sullivan, TEW Resource Book One: Introduction to the Terrorism Early Warning Group, 3. 
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environment, they have been largely overlooked by the Department of Homeland 
Security as well as other federal agencies who continue to establish federal hoops for 
locals to jump through in order to receive funding.  
These programs have tremendous value when it comes to preventing terror attacks 
at the local level, but they must be expanded to reach into the smaller, more rural 
communities where terrorists can still effectively prepare undetected, for attacks on major 
cities and soft targets. Using the Mission Specific Clusters and the LBN as the platform 
to expand these programs can eliminate those pockets of vulnerability.    
Once the networks are complete the lines of communications needed to 
successfully deal with terrorism will be established. The final network is pictured in 
Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4. The National Prevention Network 
 
E. NATIONWIDE IMPLEMENTATION OF PREVENTION PROGRAMS 
Clearly, nationwide implementation of programs like Operations Nexus and 
Operation TIPP distributed at the local level through the MSC’s will capitalize on the 
existing expertise among the various clusters and maximizes the benefit of existing 
relationships already established by the Mission Specific Clusters with the more than five 
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dozen business/industry resource vulnerabilities identified in these programs. For 
example, using the agencies within the Transportation Agency Cluster (TAC) to educate 
commercial driving schools, marinas, and railway commuters, ensures minimal 
disruption to existing agency activities. 
National distribution efforts will form the basis of the LBN that will eventually 
reach across the nation and be tied into regional fusion centers where relevant 
information can be tracked and analyzed.  
1. Creating Regional Fusion Centers 
Using the TEW concept, regional fusion centers established across the country  
will provide connectivity from region to region. Once firmly established the regional 
network will become national and eventually global to include our allies and neighbors in 
other regions of the globe. 
2. Connecting at the National and Global Level 
The regional fusion centers will be connected through the existing Joint Terrorism 
Task Force structure established by the FBI. These existing partnerships facilitate the 
efficient exchange of information between local and federal agencies. From there existing 
conduits for connection with the Department of Homeland Security’s Operations Center 
(HSOC) will ensure national situational awareness of threats and warnings. Information 
can then be shared through the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of 





A. CLARIFYING ACCOUNTABILITY AND CHANGING PERCEPTIONS 
The roadmap outlined in this proposal describes the most crucial steps for 
transforming our local law enforcement agencies into a formidable network that can 
significantly reduce our vulnerability to future acts of terrorism.  
The process begins by clarifying the role of SLTLE agencies in the National 
Strategy when it comes to preventing future terror attacks. It must be clear who will be 
held accountable for what in terms of preparedness and activities. Local law enforcement 
leaders must understand that they will be held accountable for ensuring that their 
agencies are fully engaged in preventing future attacks, not just responding to them.  
Success in this area will be dependent on our ability to change the perceptions 
both internally and externally. Thus it will be critical that we change the message and 
form the proper perspectives as to local law enforcement’s role. The message that SLTLE 
is responsible for preventing terror attacks must come from the top and be constantly 
reinforced in public messages and federal strategies and plans produced by  all levels of 
government. The public and local government leaders must understand the important role 
of local police officers in prevention or missions, budgets and strategies will not shift to 
support their role.  
The local community must also understand that their local police officers can and 
should be engaged in terrorism prevention and that these efforts will not reduce law 
enforcement’s effectiveness in preventing traditional crimes; rather it will enhance their 
capabilities to pursue traditional criminal organizations that may aid in future attacks. It is 
the government’s obligation to prepare society for what may become the inevitable if the 
appropriate steps are not taken.  
B. PREVENTION AND FUNDING 
While efforts to improve response to terrorist attacks should continue, the 
President and Secretary of Homeland Security must expand this push to place greater 
emphasize on the importance of prevention at the local level. To this end the risk-based 
analysis used to provide financial support for local efforts must factor in the risk of 
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missing early planning efforts of terrorists in areas outside of our major cities. The 
financial investment needed is not substantial and certainly supports the cost-benefit 
analysis in terms of reducing vulnerabilities to our most at risk targets.  
C. IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATION 
Emphasis on intelligence and information sharing should also continue however, 
there must be increased focus on developing appropriate intelligence requirements for all 
levels of government that will improve the efficiency of the information that is gathered 
and exchanged. A finite set of standards should govern each level so that SLTLE 
agencies understand what information is needed from them and the federal agencies 
understand what the SLTLE need in return.  
The President must continue his push to establish effective governmental 
structures that are best suited to deal with terrorism in the future. This can be done by 
aligning local agencies in a network structure that capitalizes on their core competencies 
and traditional roles through the creation of the Mission Specific Clusters that will form 
the National Law Enforcement Network. This structure will facilitate the most efficient 
use of SLTLE in the National Strategy, especially when it comes to including the private 
sector.  
D. LEADING AND IMPLEMENTING CHANGE 
The role of the Department of Homeland Security will be to support the strategic 
and tactical prevention efforts of the SLTLE by funding programs like Operation TIPP 
and the TEW’s. The development of training videos, programs and materials require 
minimal funding and will provide the most efficient means to educate local police 
officers. Distribution of these programs will be accomplished through the Mission 
Specific Clusters and coordination will be managed by the TEW’s.   
The agencies within each of the Mission Specific Clusters must be tasked with 
establishing the Local Business Network through the use of existing programs like 
Operations TIPP and Nexus. These are local initiatives created by local agencies that 
understand the needs of the community as well as the needs of the government. This 
makes the most sense as it is the local police officers that will be the face of government 
in times of a crisis. They have already established the relationships needed to build the 
networks and certainly are the most appropriate ones to do so.  
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Additionally, local law enforcement has already established many of the needed 
relationships with the private sector that will be needed to support the new prevention 
network. The implementation of these programs across the nation will capitalize on the 
existing regional efforts already underway at the local level and will facilitate their 
expansion to include national and eventually global efforts.  
The Department of Homeland Security must continue to work with agencies at all 
levels to develop the appropriate intelligence requirements that will meet the needs of all 
agencies and facilitate the most efficient means of information sharing. 
1. The Homeland Security Strategic Cycle for SLTLE 
Local law enforcement leaders must extend agency capabilities beyond response 
preparedness. Countering terrorism in today’s environment must begin at the local level 
and its effectiveness will depend on the SLTLE agencies ability to think strategically as 
they work towards building the capability to detect, prevent and deter terrorist activity or 
attack. The Homeland Security Strategic Cycle in Figure 5 illustrates the expanded 





Figure 5. Homeland Security Strategic Preparedness Cycle for NLEN 
 
1.  Sensing – Ability to recognize and investigate subtle activities that may indicate 
preparation for an attack. 
2. Shielding - Deterrence based on ability to deny access to potential targets and 
increase operational risks to terrorists. 
3. Networking- Ability to work within Mission Specific Clusters through enhanced 
detection capabilities and establish external LBN through daily operations. 
4. Adapting - Ability to integrate new skills and capabilities into a profession that is 
largely based on tradition, and sustain them over time. 
5. Sustaining – Ability to maintain skills, networks and programs over extended 
periods of time, including all activities related to training, supplies, maintenance, 
and public affairs. 
SLTLE Homeland Security Strategic Cycle 
Shielding  
Deter based on ability to 




Ability to work within MSC through 
enhanced detection capabilities 
and establish external LBN through 
daily operations 
Sustaining 
Ability to maintain 
networks and programs 
over extended periods 
Command 
Ability to establish and 
maintain effective 
strategic & operational 
control of complex threat 
environments 
Adapting 
Ability to integrate new 
capabilities and sustain  
them over time   
Sensing 
Ability to recognize and 
investigate subtle 
activities that may 
indicate preparation for 
an attack. 
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6. Command – Serves as the nexus of all other functions; the ability to lead change 
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VIII. STRATEGIC POLICY DOCUMENTS 
A. NATIONAL STRATEGY 
A cohesive National Strategy document is needed to set local law enforcement’s 
roles and expectations and provide a structured approach for terrorism prevention for 
both transnational and domestic terrorist groups. However, creating a new strategy is not 
encouraged as there are more than enough National Strategy documents already in 
existence. Utilizing existing policies and directives, like the National Preparedness Goals 
along with stronger incorporation into Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 
(HSPD 8) may be a valid option. Expanding the National Goal requirements to 
emphasize local law enforcement prevention capabilities also provides a mechanism to 
motivate compliance in accordance with the Department of Homeland Security’s “risk-
based” funding programs. Incorporation into a Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
(HSPD) also has the force of law for federal agencies and would require implementation.  
B. LOCAL AND REGIONAL OPERATIONAL POLICIES 
Regional Partnerships must be encouraged to leverage state and local law 
enforcement resources, supported by federal capabilities and funding. This allows 
funding to remain consistent with Secretary Chertoff’s new risk-based funding policy 
without excluding smaller agencies that serve high-risk planning and preparation areas 
for future attacks.   
Using the National Law Enforcement Network creates a national level incentive 
for local law enforcement leadership to engage in prevention strategy. Through the use of 
fusion centers in the Regional Metropolitan Area Cluster’s82 smaller agencies need only 
engage in the TIPP concept and participation in the establishment of the Local Business 
Network – both can be accomplished without internal organizational change.  
C. INCENTIVES 
Performance measures must be created for Department of Homeland Security 
funding programs aimed specifically at local law enforcement terrorism prevention 
                                                 
82 This should be funded through the Department of Homeland Security, Urban Area Security 
Initiative (UASI) Grant Program. 
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efforts, and mechanisms must be developed to encourage and leverage regional resources 
beyond the current Urban Area Security Initiatives. 
While funding for educational and training programs for law enforcement in 
subtle activity prevention would be minimal, they should be developed in consensus with 
major law enforcement associations and their members. 
D. IMPLEMENTATION MODEL 
Immediate implementation focus should be on suburban and rural agencies which 
currently lack the necessary skills and conduits to engage in an effective prevention 
strategy. The agencies in the Regional Metropolitan Area Clusters should provide support 
for these agencies through regional funding.  
The goal of this research is to resolve the issues noted above through the 
development of an operational model that could be used at a national level. The policy 
options proposed have been formulated with an eye towards supporting the National 
Strategy at the local level and will support key Homeland Security principles. With these 
strategic documents, the operational implementation model will need to be developed 
with specific guidelines for adoption that will not require structural change, rather allow 
incorporation into existing organizational designs and structures. Otherwise, many 
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